The Monetary Policy of the European Central Bank

The first six years of ECB monetary policy are examined using a general framework that allows central bankers to weight differently positive and negative deviations of inflation, output and the interest rate from their reference values. The empirical analysis on synthetic euro‐area data suggests that the objective of price stability is symmetric, whereas the objectives of real activity and interest‐rate stabilizations are not. Output contractions imply larger policy responses than output expansions of the same size, while movements in the interest rate are larger when the level of the interest rate is relatively high. The hypothesis of M3 growth‐rate targeting is rejected.     

Short-memory equilibrium in stochastic overlapping generations economies

In stochastic OLG exchange economies, we show that short-memory equilibria—the natural extension from deterministic economies of steady states, low-order cycles, or finite state-space stationary sunspots equilibria—fail to exist generically in utilities. As a result, even with independent and identically distributed exogenous shocks there is serial correlation in endogenous economic variables in equilibrium. This arises even if utilities are time-separable, some goods inferior, and there are no technological lags. Hence, the origins of economic fluctuations can be traced only to the demographic structure of a heterogeneous agent, multiple-good economy.     

Revisiting Savage in a conditional world

Summary. I present an axiomatization of subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating in a conditional decision problem. This result improves our understanding of the Bayesian standard from two perspectives: 1) it uses a set of axioms which are weak and intuitive; 2) it provides a formal proof to results on the relation between dynamic consistency, expected utility and Bayesian updating which have never been explicitly proved in a fully subjective framework. Received: December 1, 2000; revised version: February 26, 2001     

Competition and cooperation among exchanges: A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards

We analyze firms’ choice of exchange to list equity and exchanges’ choice of listing standards when insiders have private information about firm value, but outsiders can produce (noisy) information at a cost. Exchanges are populated by two kinds of investors, whose numbers vary across exchanges: sophisticated (low information production cost) investors and ordinary (high–cost) investors. While firms are short-lived, exchanges are long-lived, value-maximizing agents whose listing and disclosure standards evolve over time. The listing standards chosen by exchanges affect their “reputation,” since outsiders can partially infer the rigor of these standards from the post-listing performance of firms. We show that, while exchanges use their listing standards as a tool in competing for listings with other exchanges, this will not necessarily lead to a “race to the bottom” in listing standards. Further, a merger between two exchanges may result in a higher listing standard for the combined exchange relative to that of either of the merging exchanges. We develop several other implications for firms’ listing choices and resulting valuation effects, the impact of competition and co-operation among exchanges on listing standards, and the optimal regulation of exchanges.     

Arbitrage Free Price Bounds for Property Derivatives

Market frictions inhibit the perfect replication of property derivatives, and define the property spread as a price measure in the incomplete real estate market. We identify transaction costs, transaction time, and short sale constraints as the main frictions in this market. Based on these frictions, we set up a framework of arbitrage free price bounds for property derivatives. In turn, we use observed derivative prices to determine the implied cost of the frictions. Lastly, we verify these values by using other research, which confirms the accuracy of our framework.     

The indirect effects of foreign direct investment on trade: A network perspective

The relationship between international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) is one of the main features of globalisation. In this paper, we investigate the effects of FDI on trade from a network perspective, since FDI takes not only direct but also indirect channels from origin to destination countries because of firms’ incentive to reduce tax burden, to minimise coordination costs and to break barriers to market entry. We use a unique data set of international corporate control as a measure of stock FDI to construct a corporate control network (CCN), where the nodes are the countries and the edges are the corporate control relationships. Network measures, as the shortest path length and the communicability, are then computed on the CCN to capture the indirect channel of FDI. Empirically, we find that corporate control has a positive effect on trade both directly and indirectly. The result is robust with different specifications and estimation strategies. Hence, our paper provides strong empirical evidence of the indirect effects of FDI on trade. Moreover, we identify a number of interplaying factors such as regional trade agreements and the region of Asia. We also find that the indirect effects are more pronounced for the manufacturing sector than for primary sectors such as oil extraction and agriculture.